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Abstract
Making accurate predictions of corporate credit ratings is a crucial issue to both in-
vestors and rating agencies. In this paper we investigate the determinants of credit
ratings in relation to nancial factors. Using a dynamic ordered probit model and an-
nual data on US rms rated by Fitch we nd that nancial factors impact di¤erently
on credit ratings, depending on whether the rm-groups face binding nancing con-
straints. These results indicate that the nancial constraint is a fairly priced dimension
in the credit ratings industry. In addition, when we analyze the predictive ability of
the models we nd that the dynamic approach has substantial predictive ability in
contrast to its static counterpart.
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1 Introduction
Recent turmoil in the nancial markets has focused attention on the rating agencies and
the process by which they assign ratings to rms and their nancial obligations. Analysis
of ratings has a long pedigree (see Pogue and Soldofski (1969); Pinches and Mingo (1973);
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) and Kao and Wu (1990)) and has sought to explain the rela-
tionship between ratings and nancial or business risks. One particular focus has been the
examination of ratings behavior over time - the consideration of increased volatility in corpo-
rate creditworthiness during the mid-1980s and early 1990s and the accompanied downward
momentum. Recent examples include Blume et al. (1998) (BLM) and Amato and Furne
(2004) (AF). The rst paper, documents that credit ratings have, on average, become worse
through time - so that a rm initially rated as AA on the basis of its risk characteristics
has been rated lower than AA subsequently. Blume et al. (1998) argue that their results
provide evidence that the standards of ratings agencies have indeed become more stringent
over time. By contrast, Amato and Furne (2004) do not identify a secular change in rat-
ing standards. In some specications, they even nd that the standards of ratings agencies
have become more lenient over time. Their results imply that ratings changes are driven by
cyclical changes to business and nancial risks, and not to cycle-related changes to rating
standards. The debate on the cyclicality in ratings is still ongoing.
Credit ratings agencies publish opinions that stem from fundamental credit analysis and
are expressed through the familiar natural (ordinal) rankings, meaning that ratings can be
ordered from the highest to the lowest in some meaningful fashion. This analysis incorpo-
rates an evaluation of nancial statement analysis, franchise value and management quality.
It seeks to predict the probability that an obligor will make promised payments in a timely
manner. In this paper we o¤er methodological extensions to examine the consistency of
the rating process. First, we determine whether agenciesapproach to rating assignment
systematically accounts for the risks associated with the nancial and business structure of
the obligor. A probit methodology is ideally suited to evaluate the ordinal nature of ratings
because it assigns probabilities to ratings based on the measurable business and nancial
risk characteristics of rms in a systematic fashion. Second, we explore the determinants of
ratings allowing for rm-level heterogeneity. BLM nd in their paper that accounting ratios
are more informative for larger rms compared to smaller rms, noting the implications for
regulatory agencies. In addition, Pagratis and Stringa (2007) nd that nancial variables
tend to have a more pronounced e¤ect on subinvestment bank ratings compared to invest-
ment bank ratings. We argue that it is equally important to consider the binary classication
nancially constrainedversus not nancially constrained since this characteristic dra-
matically alters perceptions of creditworthiness, access to credit and defaults. Accounting
for heterogeneity in rmscharacteristics will determine whether the nancing constraint cri-
terion is correctly priced by the credit ratings industry in its ratings methodology. Similarly,
it is worthwhile to test whether behavior during downturns and credit crunches di¤ers from
periods of boom and credit availability. Therefore we add to the literature in four ways.
First, we contribute methodologically by employing a dynamic approach to credit ratings
determinants due to high persistence in credit ratings. Previous studies that analyze the
determinants of credit ratings in relation to business and nancial risks (BLM (1998), AF
(2004)) use static ordered probit models. There is, however, clear evidence of persistence
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in ratings, and the rating agencies aim to rate through the cycle, so our model allows for
persistence in the observed outcomes due to state dependence (initial and previous states)
and uses a dynamic ordered probit model.
Second, we provide rigorous tests to examine for the rst time the e¤ects of nancial
variables on rmscredit ratings, di¤erentiating between constrainedand unconstrained
rms. Exploiting rm-specic heterogeneity in the context of credit ratings appears to be
important for both ratings agencies and investors. The argument is that ratings changes (and
especially downgrades) can have a disproportionate impact on an issuers cost and availability
of capital, the price of bonds, and occasionally, equity (c.f. Cantor and Mann (2003))
Therefore, it is of particular importance to disentangle the impact of nancial variables for
rms being credit constrained.
Third, we also look at rms in downturns/crunches. In doing so, we address the issue of
procyclicality in ratings and its impact on di¤erent types of rms. Procyclicality of ratings
is important because it can exacerbate a distressed companys di¢ culties and ultimately
its ability to access credit. There is strong evidence in the literature (see Johnson (2003)
and Pagratis and Stringa (2007)) that under these conditions and for rms classied as
constrained, there will be greater sensitivity to business and nancial risks.
Finally, we evaluate the proportion of correct predictions from each dynamic model to
directly assess the predictive ability of ratings, correcting for the e¤ect of persistence that
upwardly bias the evaluation, using Mertons correct prediction statistic (Merton (1981)).
This extends earlier models by, for example, Amato and Furne (2004) who evaluate the
relative performance of the estimated models in terms of an informal goodness of t indicator
(by comparing the predicted ratings to the observed ones). Our test will give us a better
indicator of the truepredictive ability of rating models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two gives a brief summary of the rating process
in credit ratings agencies. In Section three we discuss the methodology. Section four presents
the data used in our empirical analysis. Section ve reports the results and Section six the
model predictions. In Section seven we check the robustness of our ndings. Section eight
concludes the paper.
2 Ratings and corporate nance
Ratings provided by credit risk agencies are an assessment of the issuers ability to service
debt in a timely manner and are intended to be comparable across industry groups and
countries. The ratings assigned from these agencies are expressed in letter form, ranging
from AAA (Aaa for Moodys), the highest, to C, the lowest. The division of the rating scale
into these buckets is intended to divide a continuum of risk into discrete risk classes based
on an assessment of the capacity of the debt issuer to meet its ongoing nancial obligations.
The highest rating, AAA, indicates an extremely strong capacity to pay interest and repay
principal, while the lowest rating, C, indicates a serious vulnerability to default on payment.
Debt rated from AAA to BBB is considered investment grade, while debt rated at BB
and below is considered speculativegrade. Three rating agencies, Moodys, Standard and
Poors and Fitch, have a long history and dominate the US credit rating industry. The
rst two agencies have a policy of rating all taxable corporate bonds publicly issued in the
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US, while Fitch rate issuers on request. The bond ratings provided by these agencies are
generally comparable and the rating scales are found to be uniform.
Rating agencies have standardized procedures for the preparation of ratings and the
conduct of rating committees. At the beginning of the rating process agencies gather infor-
mation su¢ cient to evaluate the risk to investors who own or buy a given security. This is
done by employing a primary analyst who is responsible for the formulation of the rating
opinion. Fitchs analysis is based on information received from all available sources, (see
Fitch (2006b)). This includes relevant publicly available information on the issuer, such as
company nancial and operational statements, reports led with regulatory agencies and
other economic and industry reports. As well as incorporating public information, Fitch
uses private/condential information directly provided by the rated issuer. The gathered
information and the proposed rating is then reviewed in a committee which develops a con-
clusion on the appropriate rating. The size of the committee for rating decisions varies and
generally includes the managing director and the primary analyst. The committee make use
of both qualitative and quantitative analyses that most appropriately reects the current
situation and prospective performance. If there are no unresolved issues, a rating is assigned
and the outcome of the committee is communicated to the marketplace and market partici-
pants. These ratings are monitored on an ongoing basis to determine whether they should be
changed. Any changes whether an a¢ rmation, downgrade, or upgrade become publicly
available.
Frequent changes in ratings, however, are not desirable from the point of view of in-
vestors. Rating agencies claim that they provide both stable and accurate rating systems
by rating through the cycle, implying that their ratings should be stable over time and
independent of the state of the business cycle, conditional on its underlying nancial and
business characteristics (c.f Amato and Furne (2004)). The longevity and success of the
rating agencies suggest that the production of such risk systems has been greatly appreci-
ated by investors. Cantor and Mann (2003) argue that rating reversals are rare even at a
ve-year horizon. Yet, the large number of rating downgrades during the US corporate credit
meltdown in 20012002 cast some doubts on the role, inuence and dynamic properties of
credit ratings. In this paper we ask how useful information is embodied in a dynamic model
in terms of producing accurate predicted ratings. We then go further to explore the impact
of nancial factors and cyclicality.
3 Methodology
Before we can properly evaluate the ratings procedure undertaken by the ratings agencies, it
is important to take into account the characteristics of ratings and the issuing rms that are
being rated. In this section we explain how we modify the existing methodologies to account
for these characteristics. First, we present the ordered probit analysis employed so far in
the literature. Second, we take note of the persistence in ratings and ensure that our model
giving the probability that an issuer will fall into a particular rating category accounts for
the information in the past history of ratings. We explain how a dynamic ordered probit
model does this. Third, because rms have heterogeneous responses to information variables
indicating creditworthiness, these will be a critical factor in determining an issuers rating.
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We therefore allow for categorizations that distinguish between rms that are likely to be
nancially constrained and those that are not. We expect issuers to respond di¤erently to
measures of business and nancial risk according to whether they are nancially constrained
or unconstrained. Fourth, we allow for the rating agencies practice of rating "through
the cycle" by looking for persistence in the ratings and distinguish between periods of credit
crunch/recession versus other times when credit is not restricted and the economy is healthy.
Finally, we explain how the evaluation of ratings using tests of predictive performance can
quantify the ability of our model to predict ratings using the types of information used by
ratings agencies.
3.1 Baseline model
We begin our analysis with the static framework which serves as a starting point and will
be used for comparison purposes. Credit ratings can be viewed as resulting from a con-
tinuous, unobserved creditworthiness index. Each rating corresponds to a specic range of
the creditworthiness index, with higher ratings corresponding to higher creditworthiness val-
ues. Therefore, credit ratings are discrete-valued indicators and have an ordinal ranking.
Typically, credit ratings are modeled through an ordered probit methodology.
We dene the categorical variable y = 1, 2,.., 5 according to the actual rating assigned
to each rm. Without loss of generality we record AAA-AA as 1, A as 2 . . . B-CC as 5.
This ordinal response can be modeled through a static ordered probit model of the following
type:
yit = Xit + i + it
where i= 1,. . . , N refers to rms and t= 2,. . . , T refers to time periods, Xit denotes a
set of explanatory variables for rm i and year t. i is a rm-specic and time invariant
component and it is the disturbance term. In our analysis we consider a pooled probit which
does not require strong exogeneity assumptions. However, our model is potentially subject
to a critique that this method fails to consider unobserved heterogeneity across rms. Since
our panel includes repeated estimates from each rm it is possible that the residuals from
the above model are correlated across time for the same rm within our panel. To address
this issue we correct for unobserved heterogeneity in the robustness section of the paper.
Specically, we allow the residuals to have the following random e¤ectsstructure:
it = ui + vit
where ui are independent across rms and vit are independent across all observations.
We re-estimate the model and the results are not altered by this change.
In our data yit is not observed. Thus what is observed are the credit ratings assigned
to rms, which can take ve values. The relation between the observed variable yit and the
latent variable yit is assumed to be given by:
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yit = AAA  AA if yit  1
yit = A if 1  yit < 2
:::
yit = B   CC if 5  yit
Thus the probability of yit being in a particular rating category can be estimated as:
Pr(yit = 1) = Pr(y

it < 1) = Pr(Xit + i + it < 1)
Pr(yit = 2) = Pr(1  yit < 2) = Pr(1  Xit + i + it < 2)
:::
P r(yit = 5) = Pr(y

it < 5) = Pr(Xit + i + it < 5)
The latent variable yit can then be estimated through standard maximum likelihood.
3.2 Persistence and the dynamic ordered probit framework
It is has been argued that agencies are sometimes slow to respond to new information (see
Odders-White and Ready (2006)). This occurs primarily for reasons inherent in the rating
setting process within the credit ratings industry. Several studies note that rating changes
tend to exhibit serial correlation (see Carty and Fons (1994) and Gonzalez et al. (2004)).
Cantor and Mann (2003) argue that rating reversals are rare even at a ve-year horizon. In
fact, rating agencies claim that they rate through the cycle implying that credit ratings
should be stable over time.1 Altman and Kao (2004) document serial autocorrelation in
ratings below investment grade suggesting that a downgrade is more likely to be followed
by a subsequent downgrade than by an upgrade. Finally, Pagratis and Stringa (2007) show
that bank ratings tend to be sticky and therefore persistence appears to be very important
in predicting bank ratings.
One basic premise of this paper is that modeling credit ratings should take into account
the persistent nature of ratings. Persistence in rating outcomes is observable from Figure
1. It shows that zero changesdominate in the sample and that usually Fitch alters its
ratings by one category (either upwards or downwards). Based on the above analysis, we are
prompted to recognize the dynamic nature of ratings and therefore we opt for modeling credit
ratings in a dynamic ordered probit setting. As such, the dynamic ordered probit appears
as the most suitable technique to empirically evaluate the relationship between measures of
business and nancial risk and a probability based assessment of the rating.
We estimate our model including previous rating states in order to capture state de-
pendence and the model can be interpreted as a rst-order Markov process. We estimate
1 Long-term is a somewhat vague concept and generally appears to mean at least one business cycle.
Ratings agencies, however, claim that they are using an indenite time horizon.
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the dynamic model allowing for state dependence and accounting for the initial conditions
problem (Heckman (1981) and Wooldridge (2005)). We adopt the procedure suggested by
Wooldridge (2005) to deal with the problem of initial conditions. This problem is due to
the generic feature of the panel that rms (or individuals) inherit di¤erent unobserved and
time-invariant characteristics which a¤ect outcomes in every period. The general dynamic
specication that we estimate can be written as:
yit = Xit + yit 1 + yi0 + i + it
yit 1 is a vector of lagged values of the dependent variable and yi0 is the initial period
value. i is a rm-specic and time invariant component and it is the disturbance term. To
control for cyclical factors originating from the business cycle we include time dummies in
our regressions. Following Iskander and Emery (1994) we include industry dummy variables
to control for di¤erent regulations within industrial groups.
3.3 Constrained/unconstrained rms
A large literature has considered the impact of nancial constraints on investment in xed
capital, inventory investment, and employment and R&D activities (see Hubbard (1998) for
a survey). In many cases the response of rms to indicators of creditworthiness is found to
be dependent on whether rms are likely to be nancially constrainedor not nancially
constrained; however, the results can be inuenced by the categorization process used to
determining whether rms are nancially constrainedor unconstrained(see, e.g, Fazzari
et al. (1988, 2000); Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and the discussion in Cleary (1999),
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Guariglia and Mateut (2006), Almeida and Campello
(2007) and Guariglia (in press)). The scholarly literature has not settled on a universally
accepted strategy to identify nancially constrainedand unconstrainedrms empirically,
but the classication scheme can be critically important for the conclusions of these studies.
Therefore, in this paper we use the widely used technique in empirical research on nancing
constraints employing three di¤erent measures to ensure the robustness of our results, these
are indebtedness, dividend payout ratio and size.
Size was employed as a criterion by Bougheas et al. (2006) and is the key proxy for capital
market access by manufacturing rms in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) because small rms
are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections and thus more likely to be nancially
constrained. The dividend payout ratio, as measured by the ratio of total dividends to total
assets, has been used by Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000)
because it is argued that rms will refrain from distributing earnings if they expect to rely on
these for real investment, and they will do so if they are nancially constrained. Firms that
are more indebted (based on the gearing ratio, dened as total debt over shareholdersequity)
are more likely to pay a higher external nance premium on bonds since they have a greater
probability of bankruptcy (Bougheas et al. (2006)), which can raise the cost of borrowing,
and negatively a¤ect the availability of credit. We report results using all three classication
schemes. We dene as nancially constrained (unconstrained) within an industry those rms
whose total sales, leverage and dividends in a given year are in the bottom (top) 25% of the
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corresponding distribution of all the rms in that particular industry and year. We also
allow rms to transit between rm classes.2
We use indebtedness, dividend payout ratio and size to dene a dummy vector consisting
of three di¤erent binary variables reecting nancing constraints. This nancial constraint
dummy vector, Cit, is interacted with measures of business and nancial risk to determine
whether the rating probability assigned by the dynamic ordered probit model varies with
this categorization:
yit = XitCit + yit 1 + yi0 + i + it
Here the dummy vector (Cit) is interacted with the vector of business and nancial risk
variables (Xit) in our baseline specication. It will be apparent from these models whether
business and nancial risk information is weighted di¤erently for nancially constrained
versus unconstrained rms by the signicance of the coe¢ cients on the interacted term.
From the ratings predictions we will be able to determine whether measures of predictive
ability (SC and CP scores) are noticeably di¤erent when we account for this characteristic
of issuers.
3.4 Rating and the cycle
Rating agencies have two broad objectives accuracy and stability (see Cantor and Mann
(2007)). The former refers to the correlation of ratings with subsequent credit loses. The
latter refers to the frequency and magnitude of rating changes. In order to achieve stability
over time they assign ratings using a long-term perspective which takes into account one
business cycle. Therefore, ratings should be stable and not be driven in a cyclical manner
by cyclical market forces. The reason is that if ratings are procyclical, then they potentially
induce increasing market volatility and make the credit cycle more pronounced (see Cantor
and Mann (2003)). AF (2004) test whether business cycle variables have a marginal e¤ect
on the rating assigned to a rm. They present an empirical model in which, in addition to
business and nancial risks and macroeconomic conditions, distinguish secular and cyclical
inuences on ratings. They show that rating changes exhibit very little cyclicality even after
controlling for many of the nancial and economic determinants of ratings.
In our analysis we seek to determine whether business cycle e¤ects are important and
how important they are for di¤erent types of rms. This is an important dimension to
be explored since rating cyclicality can exacerbate a distressed companys di¢ culties and
ultimately its ability to access credit. We approach this issue by specifying a time-period
dummy variable to indicate that the US economy is in recession or credit crunch. The
identication of downturns and upturns follows the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the
National Bureau of Economic Research which determined that a trough in business activity
occurred in the US economy in November 2001.3 The trough marked the end of the recession
that began in March 2001 and the beginning of an expansion. This was referred to as a credit
2 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on rm-years rather than simply rms. See Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) and Guariglia and Mateut (2006) for a similar approach.
3 Our approach is consistent with other studies that looked at the procyclicality of ratings (see Cantor
and Mann (2003) and AF (2004)).
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crunch - in which some rms were excluded from gaining access to credit - it lasted from
2001- 2002, and was closely associated with the recession of 2001 (Kwan (2002)). Therefore,
in order to explore whether credit ratings move procyclicaly, we will interact a recession
dummy with all measures of business and nancial risk to determine whether the rating
probability assigned by the dynamic ordered probit model varies with the cycle and credit
conditions.
To explore the sensitivity of rmsratings and procyclicality, we employ another set of
dummy variables, where the dummy vector, Dt, takes the value 1 for the recession/credit
crunch period, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the following model:
yit = XitCitDt + yit 1 + yi0 + i + it
The dummy vector (Dt) is interacted both with the vector of nancial variables (Xit) in
our baseline specication and the dummy vector of nancing constraints (Cit) dened in the
previous sub-section. Signicant responses to rm-specic characteristics interacted with the
two dummy variables would indicate that credit ratings move in a procyclical manner. On
the other hand, insignicant coe¢ cients on the interacted nancial variables can be seen as
an indicator of the fact that rating agencies rate through the cycle. Once again, we will be
able to determine whether there is a noticeable inuence on the predictive ability of ratings
at di¤erent stages of the cycle.
3.5 Predictive ability
As a rule, the relative performance of the estimated models is evaluated in terms of an
informal goodness of t indicator, by comparing predicted ratings to the observed ones. It
is possible, however, to give a more quantitative measure of the predictive ability of our
models. We therefore propose to evaluate the prediction using two measures of predictive
ability, the SC and CP scores based on the proportions of correct predictions versus actual
outturns.
The proportion of correct predictions denoted as SC is the sum of all diagonal terms
divided by the total number of observations: that is SC = 1
T
TX
t=1
1(q^t = qt) where q^t refers
to the predicted rating and qt is the actual outcome. This measure is a simple summary
of predictive ability, but it is possible that this measure is greatly a¤ected when there is
a dominant outcome in the data e.g. if 70% of issuers are rated AA then a prediction
of AA for all rms will appear to predict correctly in 70% of cases. This is an illusion
since the model does not use the explanatory variables to make di¤erent predictions of the
probability of rating assignment, but makes only one prediction for all issuers irrespective
of the information on business and nancial risks. The measure SC cannot distinguish
between seemingly successful predictability of a stopped clockand true predictability (see
Kim et al. (forthcoming)). A second measure based on a technique proposed by Merton
(1981) can modify the SC measure in order to get a better indicator of the predictive
ability. Let CPj be the proportion of the correct predictions made by q^t when the true
state is given by qt = j. From the denition of conditional probability, CP is computed
9
as CPj =
1
T
TX
t=1
1(q^t = j)(qt = j)
1
T
TX
t=1
1(qt = j)
and the Mertons correct measure denoted CP is given by
CP = 1
J 1
J 1X
j=0
CPj   1 where J is the number of categories, and   1J 1  CP  1. This
modies the measure of predictive ability to discount the inuence of the dominant outcome.
Only when a predictor is accurate for all categories will it obtain a high CP score.
We will use these measures to determine whether the ratings agencies are using infor-
mation on business and nancial risks systematically. If they are then the dynamic ordered
probit model should deliver high SC and CP scores, revealing that there is a close corre-
spondence between the information the agencies use and the ratings that they assign.
4 Data and classication methodologies
4.1 Data Sources
We use Fitchs database as our source for data on issuer default ratings. This database
provides information on the long-term rating assigned to each issuer as well as the date that
the rating became available. Thus we can record the continuous rating history for each rm.
Our sample spans 10 years, from 1995 to 2004 and the entire ratings spectrum, unlike many
other studies that only include investment grade issuers. In keeping with the normal prac-
tice in the literature, we categorize our rms into rating categories without consideration of
notches (i.e + or -). AF (2004), emphasized that this categorization (without taking into
account the notches) considers large cumulative changes of ratings, avoids generation of rat-
ing categories with very few observations, and sidesteps agenciespractice to change ratings
notch by notch. We focus on ratings assigned at the end of December, since balance sheet
information for US rms is released on December 31. We consider seven rating categories,
ranging from AAA to CCC, which are assigned numerical values, starting with 1 to AAA, 2
to AA,. . . , 7 to CCC. Due to the fact that there are only a few AAA and CCC ratings we
group AAA and AA together creating a super-investment grade category, and similarly
we group CCC and B ratings together.4 Table 2 reports the ratings distribution of rms in
our sample.
We use Datastream to extract rm-level accounting data. The distinguishing characteris-
tic of sampled rms is that they are assigned a long-term rating from Fitch. For these rms,
we link their ratings to Datastreams balance sheet statements and prot and loss accounts.
Following selection criteria which are common in the literature, we exclude companies that
do not have complete records on our explanatory variables and rm-years with negative sales
and prots. To control for the potential inuence of outliers, we exclude observations in the
0.5 percent from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables. Data on
gross output come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We use data for ve industries:
4A similar procedure was followed by Calomiris et al (1995).
10
manufacturing, utilities, mining, services and nance. This classication corresponds to the
sectoral breakdown of the entire US economy using the Datastream level 3 sector indices,
constructed according to the 1999 FTSE reclassication.
Our combined sample contains data for 317 rm-years yielding a total number of 1906
annual observations. Firms in our sample actively operate between 1995 and 2004 in a vari-
ety of sectors such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and nancials. The panel
has an unbalanced structure with the number of observations on each rm varying between
three and ten. Our sample presents two characteristics that make it especially appealing for
our analysis. First, it includes both investment grade and high yield bonds, where previous
studies mainly restricted their attention to investment grade bonds, neglecting the e¤ects
of speculative grade bonds.5 This is particularly benecial since rms with high yield bond
issues are more likely to be characterized by adverse nancial attributes and weak balance
sheets. Hence, these rms may be subject to more intensive monitoring during recessions.
Second, the sample spans a wide range of sectors of the US economy. This is equally impor-
tant since ratings di¤er within the context of each issuers industry fundamentals. In other
words, industries that are in decline, highly competitive, capital intensive, cyclical or volatile
are inherently riskier than stable industries with few competitors, high barriers to entry, na-
tional rather than international competition and predictable demand levels. Therefore, an
issuer in a high-risk industry is unlikely to receive the highest rating possible (AAA) despite
having a conservative nancial prole.
4.2 Measures of risks
Rating agencies use a number of indicators in order to assign credit ratings. The criteria
for bank ratings are centered on ve main areas of fundamental analysis. These include
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and protability, funding and liquid-
ity (CAMEL). Accordingly, the criteria for corporate ratings consider both business and
nancial risks. Business risk can further be divided into industry characteristics and issuer
characteristics. The former category includes measures such as prospects and competition,
while the latter category involves measures such as diversication, market share and eval-
uation of management. Financial risk concerns the rms overall nancial policy and is
measured using nancial ratios. In a special criteria report Fitch emphasize the importance
of both types of risk. They state Fitchs corporate ratings make use of both qualitative
and quantitative analysis to assess the business and nancial risks of xed-income issuers.
(Fitch (2006a)).
In our empirical model the rms size, as measured by real total assets, controls for the
rms business risk. The same proxy was used by a number of empirical papers, see for
example Calomiris et al. (1995), BLM (1998) and AF (2004). In addition, we control for
business risk by including a variable that proxies for industry competition. Like Ghosal and
Loungani (1996) we measure industry competitiveness by the four-rm seller concentration
ratio (CR4). This variable is calculated using the percentage of market production supplied
by the four largest rms in the industry. Concentration ratios are one of the most common
5In the robustness section, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results by focusing on a sample with invest-
ment grade rms only.
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tools used to examine an industrys structure and, consequently, the ability of a group of
companies to exercise some control over a market, see Ghosal and Loungani (1996). We
expect that higher concentration in a given industry to improve the rating.
As for the nancial risk, Fitch considers a number of measures for cash ow, coverage
ratio and leverage.6 We follow Fitchs practice and include a set of variables accounting for
nancial risk.7 The rst measure is leverage dened as total debt over total assets. This is
intended to capture the overall indebtness of the rm. We argue that the higher this ratio the
weaker the balance sheet. Therefore, we expect to observe a negative relationship between
this variable and credit ratings. The second measure of nancial risk is the operating margin,
dened as operating prots to net sales. We use this variable to capture the rms ability to
generate prot per unit of sale. We expect higher levels of operating margin to be associated
with a stronger balance sheet and therefore better ratings. The third ratio is related to the
rms creditworthiness. We use the interest coverage ratio, as measured by earnings before
interest and taxes to interest paid, to assess the rms ability to generate cash ow in order
to pay for nancial costs. Increases in this ratio should have a positive e¤ect on the rms
balance sheet and result in improved ratings.8 Thus we expect a positive coe¢ cient on the
coverage ratio. The last measure of nancial risk is the interest burden, dened as the ratio
of interest payments to total debt. This variable was introduced by Mojon et al. (2002)
as a proxy for rm-specic interest rates to examine nancial accelerator phenomena.9 We
expect that given the fact that interest rate and credit risk are intrinsically related, rms
with higher levels of interest burden to attract lower ratings.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of our explanatory variables. To make our results
comparable with previous studies that used data on credit ratings (e.g BLM (1998) and
AF (2004)) we report summary statistics as three-year averages for all variables measuring
nancial risk. This procedure accounts for the fact that rating agencies claim to adopt a
longer-term perspective by assigning ratings through the cycle. From Table 1 we observe
that rms belonging to the investment grade spectrum are larger in terms of total sales,
have higher prot margins, lower interest burden, are more creditworthy and are less levered
compared to high yield rms.
5 Results
In this section we report the estimation results for the ordered probit models commonly used
in the literature and is similar to those of BLM (1998), AF (2004) and Alfonso et al. (2007).
6 In their words In conducting nancial analysis, Fitch emphasizes cash ow measures of earnings,
coverage and leverage [. . . ] Paramount to the analysis is the issuers ability to generate cash, which is
reected by the ratios that measure protability and coverage on a cash ow basis" (Fitch (2006a)).
7 BLM and AF use a similar set of variables but unlike these studies we decide not to include any
variables capturing equity risk because Fitchs approach attributes more weight to cash ow measures than
equity-based ratios (see Fitch (2006a)).
8We checked the robustness of our ndings by truncating the interest coverage in order to deal with
skewness. Our main results remain unchanged.
9 Firm-specic interest rate unlike the Federal Funds rate varies across rms and years and therefore
mostly reects idiosyncratic factors. The obvious advantage of using this measure of interest rates is that it
provides large cross-sectional information, which is otherwise hardly available.
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These are typically static ordered probit models so we begin by presenting a baseline model
of ratings determination that controls for both business and nancial risks without dealing
with the persistence in the ratings themselves. We then augment it by including lagged
dependent variable and initial observations. Finally, we enrich the dynamic version of the
model with variables that aim to capture nancing constraints. We use interaction terms
in our empirical specications to identify the asymmetric e¤ect of the nancial constraints.
The columns in each table indicate the estimation results for a di¤erent classication method
5.1 The baseline model
The rating criteria for S&P, Moodys and Fitchs bond ratings include business and nancial
risks. Our baseline empirical model includes a set of nancial ratios and industry variables
to control simultaneously for both types of risk. Table 3 presents the results for the model
without interaction terms. Taking the variables proxying for nancial risk we observe that
both the leverage (LEV ) and the interest burden (INTBURD) have positive coe¢ cients and
are highly signicant. This result implies that the higher the level of debt to assets and
interest payments relative to total debt, the lower the credit ratings. In addition, the oper-
ating margin (OPER) and the coverage ratio (COV ) have negative coe¢ cients showing that
creditworthy rms and those with higher prot margins have a higher probability to obtain
a better rating (recall that a lower number indicates a higher rating category i.e. 1 = AAA
and AA, 2 = A etc). These results are consistent with the existing literature in suggesting
that better nancial ratios increase the probability of being assigned a better rating (c.f.
BLM, 1998; AF, 2004; Gray et al. (2005)). The variables proxying for business risk indicate
that the rms size (SIZE) and the concentration ratio (CR4 ) have negative coe¢ cients,
which implies that rms of greater size have a higher probability of obtaining a better rat-
ing, while rms belonging to concentrated industries have a higher probability of getting a
better rating. However, concentration ratio enters as insignicant in the regression. These
results are consistent with in-house research by rating agencies, and existing evidence.10
Overall, the baseline specication suggests that both business and nancial risks are im-
portant in determining credit ratings. We point out, however, that the static probit model
ignores some important characteristics of the ratings process and the issuers that are rated.
First, there is no allowance for the persistence in ratings, which would naturally suggest that
the history of ratings would be an important determinant of the current rating. Second,
the model does not allow for the distinction between nancially constrainedand not -
nancially constrainedrms that has been shown to be signicant factor in the relationship
between rm characteristics and access to credit through bank lending and balance sheet
channels, or the investment-agency cost literature. This distinction can be critically im-
portant since explanatory variables have disproportionate e¤ects for di¤erent types of rms
classied by this criterion. Third, the model does not allow for the inuence of recessions
and credit crunches on the ratings process - and therefore cannot comment on the claim
10 As well as controlling for business and nancial risks, our model also includes both industry and time
dummies. Time dummies were included to capture any business cycle e¤ects. In line with BLM (1998) we
observe an increase in the size and signicance of our time dummies suggesting that rating agencies have
become more stringent over time. AF (2004) also nd that in their baseline model, without accounting for
trend, time dummies increase in size and signicance over time.
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that ratings agencies rate through the cycle. In the next sub-sections we attempt to cap-
ture persistency by introducing variables to the basic model that account for the previous
year rating of each rm, we also interact dummies for constraints and recession/crunch with
business and nancial risks.
5.2 Allowing for persistence in ratings
In this section we augment the baseline model and we introduce lagged dummies of each
rating category, using category BBB as the reference category, to account for the fact that
ratings are generally highly autocorrelated. As it was outlined in the methodology section,
we estimate the dynamic models allowing for state dependence and accounting for the initial
conditions problem. The results for the dynamic model are presented in Table 4.
On the whole, the estimates are similar to those reported in the previous section in the
following respects. We observe that most of the nancial variables retain their signs and
signicance as in the previous (static) specication. In other words, we still nd that LEV
and INTBURD have positive coe¢ cients and OPER and COV have negative coe¢ cients.
We draw attention to the coverage ratio, COV, which becomes signicant at the one percent
level. Finally, the rms size has a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient as before.
The lagged categories of the dependent variables - included to formally test for state
dependence - are highly statistically signicant. Put di¤erently, we nd that if a rm was
rated below investment grade in t-1 most likely it will remain in the high-yield spectrum in
the current period. Likewise, being rated as investment grade in the previous period increases
the probability of getting an investment grade rating in the current year. The coe¢ cients on
lagged ratings show a clear gradient in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient as one moves from a
previous rating status of CC to AAA-AA. In our case the baseline category is lagged BBB.
This nding indicates that - for rms issuing bonds with speculative grade status - there is
a positive relationship of obtaining junk bond status in the next period, while for rms with
investment grade bonds the relationship becomes negative. The estimated coe¢ cients for the
initial period observations are also highly signicant. This implies that there exists a positive
correlation between the initial period observations and unobserved latent creditworthiness.
To sum up, our results suggest that both nancial and the business risks continue to be
signicant inuences for the prediction of current credit ratings. Importantly we can report
that allowing for the persistence of the ratings process by estimating the model in a dynamic
ordered probit setting results in highly signicant lagged variables reinforcing our beliefs
that previous ratings status helps predict current rating status. This nding is potentially
signicant to both investors and credit ratings agencies because it reveals persistence in
ratings. There is strong evidence that the initial rating is also an important determinant of
the current rating, in other words, rms rarely transit from investment to sub-investment
grade or vice versa. Finally, it is worth noting that there is a substantial improvement in
the R-squared indicating a better t of the model. As we shall see in the next section, the
dynamic models have a substantially improved predictive ability compared to their static
counterparts.
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5.3 Financial factors and ratings
In this section we use the dummy variable, C, linked to rmsrelative size, indebtedness and
dividend payout compared to the whole distribution of rms on these criteria, to separate
rms that are likely to be nancially constrainedand those that are not. Firms in the top
25th percentile of the distribution are regarded as unconstrained and those in the bottom
25th percentile are classied as constrained. The constrained dummies are interacted with
the nancial variables to capture the reaction of rm-groups to nancial risks when they are
also likely to be nancially constrainedcompared with the reaction of those rms that are
not likely to be nancially constrained. Hence we estimate the model for rm-groups that
represent polar tails of the rm distribution. The idea is that the rating process may vary
across rating classes. Our goal is to assess whether the nancial constraint is a dimension
which is taken into account and is correctly priced by the credit ratings industry in its ratings
methodology.
Comparing across columns in Table 5 allows us to investigate the specic inuence of
each measure of constrained based on size, dividend payout ratio and level of indebtness on
each of the measures of business and nancial risk in the rows. Our results are remarkably
consistent across these three categories. Taking the leverage variable, LEV, we observe that
the estimated coe¢ cients are consistently positive and highly signicant for rms classied
separately as constrained on all three criteria (row1), but are insignicant for unconstrained
rms on the same criteria (with the exception of dividend) (row 2). This result highlights a
key connection between the impact of leverage on the rating of the rm and the designation
nancially constrained. For constrained rms, high leverage can be seen as a sign of a
deteriorating balance sheet and therefore increases the probability of a lower rating. For
unconstrained rms, the point estimates are statistically insignicant and quantitatively
unimportant. This result implies that for constrained rms, leverage issues become more
acute than for unconstrained rms.
The inuence of OPER on the probability of being in each rating category measures the
extent to which high-revenue generation enables rms to be assigned a higher rating. This
variable captures a rms ability to generate prots. The operating margin has a negative
coe¢ cient for both types of rms (rows 3 and 4), which is line with the analysis in section
5.1. It is also statistically signicant for both types of rms but with higher coe¢ cients for
unconstrained rms. The result that high-revenue generating rms attract better ratings is
consistent with evidence presented by other studies (BLM, 1998 and AF, 2004) in which rms
with higher prots are more likely to increase their rating. We conclude that protability is
an important determinant for both constrained and unconstrained rms.
Coverage ratio (COV ) measures the extent to which cash ow is su¢ cient to pay for
nancial costs and therefore proxies for creditworthiness. The point estimates are negative
for constrained and unconstrained rms (rows 5 and 6) but they are systematically negative
and signicant only for unconstrained rms (row 6). For unconstrained rms a decrease in
creditworthiness has a much larger impact on credit ratings compared to constrained rms,
whose credit ratings may have already incorporated the possibility of limited creditworthiness
in their balance sheets. We noted earlier than investment grade rms have substantially
higher coverage ratios than sub-investment grade rms.
Interest burden (INTBURD) measures the impact of the interest rate payments at the
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rm-level because it reects the level of the interest rate and the exposure to interest bearing
debt but it also reects the general monetary policy stance since tightening or loosening of
policy is reected in the burden. Comparing the estimated coe¢ cients for interest burden, we
observe that they are positive but generally insignicant for both types of rms, except one
case (rows 7 and 8). This result implies that a high interest burden increases the probability
of a speculative grade rating for both types of rms but its signicance is limited.
Our econometric model also includes a set of variables that control for business risks
(Size and CR4). We nd that larger rms tend to attract higher ratings because they have
signicant negative coe¢ cients. This result conrms the information asymmetry problem
that small rms are likely to face, and are consistent with the research line that suggests
that high costs of external nance are related to asymmetric information (see Carpenter
et al. (1994) and Calomiris and Hubbard (1995)). In other words, we show that larger
rms are assigned higher ratings with higher probability because they are associated with
the lower degree of informational asymmetry. In addition, we nd that the concentration
ratio is negative, as in the baseline model, indicating that rms belonging to industries with
lower concentration have a higher probability of getting a higher rating but the coe¢ cient is
marginally insignicant.11
The estimated coe¢ cients of lagged rating categories are, once again, highly statistically
signicant. Even allowing for rms classied as likely to be nancially constrainedor not,
does not undermine the persistence in ratings. We nd that being assigned an investment
grade rating (AAA-AA, A, BBB) in the previous period increases the probability of getting
an investment grade rating in the current year. The same applies for speculative grade
rating. This result clearly indicates that rating assignment in the previous year is closely
associated with the rating obtained in the following year, even allowing for the impact of
characteristics such as being nancially constrained on the basis of indicator such as relative
size or indebtedness which are themselves persistent.
5.4 The procyclicality of ratings
Whether credit ratings are procyclical or not is an open question. Previous evidence suggests
procyclicality of credit quality changes by showing that estimated credit losses are much
higher in a contraction relative to an expansion (Bangia et al. (2002)). Nickell et al. (2000)
nd that default probabilities depend on the business cycle with lower rated rms being
a¤ected the most. However, rating agencies claim that credit ratings do not vary with the
cycle: in other words they rate through the cycle (Moodys (2002) and Fitch (2006a)).
AF (2004) do not detect any excessive procyclicality in ratings assignments and implicitly
assume that any procyclicality is driven by cyclical changes to business and nancial risks,
and not by business cycle-related changes to rating standards.
This section addresses the issue of procyclality of ratings by examining the sensitivity
of ratings to balance sheet variables in the 2001-02 recession/credit crunch episode versus
11 We also include a set of time dummies to control for common trends and business cycle e¤ects, and a set
of industry dummies to control for xed e¤ects across industries. Once again, we observe that time dummies
are signicant and increase over time showing that credit standards have become, on average, worse over
time for rms under scrutiny. Industry dummies are also signicant indicating that industry-level di¤erences
are signicant in predicting credit ratings.
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other times. To explore the response to rm-specic characteristics when the economy is in
recession/credit crunch we interact the explanatory variables with a recession/credit crunch
dummy, D. Table 6 reports coe¢ cients on variables interacted with the dummy variable
D (recession/credit crunch) and interacted with 1-D (out of recession/credit crunch) for
constrained and unconstrained rms.
Results are reported in Table 6. When the recession/credit crunch dummy is interacted
with constrained and unconstrained rms we observe that nancial variables for both types
of rms are more sensitive outside the recession/credit crunch, 1-D. Ratings vary more with
these business and nancial risks outside of recession/crunch than they do when there is
a recession/crunch. Specically, we nd evidence that there is greater sensitivity to LEV,
OPER and INTBURD for non-recession/crunch versus recession/crunch. We also nd some
marginal evidence that leverage is signicant during recessions for constrained rms indicat-
ing that nancing constraints are more binding for nancially weak rms. We conclude that
the 2001-02 recession/credit crunch had a very limited impact through the balance sheet
on credit ratings in the US bond market. We conrm Amato and Furnes result that rat-
ings do not exhibit a substantial degree of comovement with business cycles, but show some
movement with business and nancial risk measures.
6 Model Predictions
This section evaluates the predictive ability of the ordered probit models presented in the
sections above. The standard way of measuring the goodness of t of ordered probit models
is the construction of contingency tables where one can compare predicted ratings to actual
ratings. The outcome of this exercise is shown in Tables 7 and 8 which correspond to
the estimated models in section 5. Reading across each row gives the number of predicted
observations per category against the actual outcome in the leftmost column. For example,
the rst row shows the number of observations with actual rating of AAA-AA, while the
second row those with rating BBB etc. To correctly evaluate the predictive ability of our
model we employ two di¤erent statistics, SC and CP. We expect the former statistic to be
inuenced by the dominant outcome in the data while the latter to overcome this problem
by providing a better indication.
We begin by comparing results using the baseline model shown in Table 7. We observe
that the baseline model correctly predicts AAA-AA 58 times, A 594 times, BBB 334 times,
BB 14 times and B 0 times. There are 1000 occasions when the correct prediction is made,
hence we nd that the SC= 1000/1737, which suggests that we have approximately 57
percent correct predictions. The outcome of this exercise highlights two important issues.
First, that the result obtained may be articially high and driven by dominant outcomes
in the data. In our case A is the dominant category and therefore it is possible that our
results are due to this outcome. Second, that these results reect a common feature of static
ordered probit models in that the highest and the lowest categories are underestimated.
To circumvent the rst problem we allow for the dominant outcome by reporting the Mer-
ton correct predictions statistic. This test calculates correct predictions using the proportion
of correct predictions for each of the ve rating categories: CP1= 58/97, CP2= 594/1007,
CP3 = 334=605, CP4=14/26 and CP5=0/2. This test implies that CP= 0.32, which shows
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a lower but still reasonable predictive ability of our model.12
As for the models underprediction for rms of low credit quality relative to higher credits,
we follow a dynamic approach since it is likely that the relative poor performance of the model
is due to the fact that it does not take account of the persistence of ratings. If this is the
case, we would expect a substantial improvement when we add dynamics in the ordered
probit model.
Moving to model prediction when using the dynamic ordered probit models (Table 8) we
nd that the proportion of correct predictions against the actual outcomes is SC= 1465/1551,
indicating approximately 94 percent of predictions is correct. Comparing this statistic with
the Merton correct prediction we nd CP= 0.90, which shows a substantial improvement
in the predictive ability of the model even after allowing for the dominant outcome e¤ect.
According to both statistics the dynamic model outperforms the static one by far, showing an
impressive improvement of 58 percentage points on the CP score. In addition, we no longer
observe any overrating or underrating in the model predictions. The AAA-AA category
predicts 170 cases out of 184 actuals - a remarkably high score, and B-CC predicts 16 out
of 19. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is that credit ratings are
indeed highly autocorrelated and previous yearsratings are a key variable when predicting
current ratings.
Similar results are found for the model which is augmented with dummy variables prox-
ying for nancial constraints and for recessions/crunches. The SC statistic indicates correct
prediction around the region of 95 percent, whereas the CP statistic appears to lie in the
region of 90 percent. Both tests are reported at the foot of the corresponding Tables.
Summarizing, allowing for ratings persistence leads to more accurate predictions of credit
ratings compared to the static model. We also nd even after adding lagged ratings the vari-
ables proxying for business and nancial risks remain signicant and precisely determined.
Finally, the improved predictive ability of the model holds when we distinguish between
constrained and unconstrained rms and recessions and non-recession periods.
7 Robustness tests
We now test the robustness of our previous ndings. These additional checks involve esti-
mation of our empirical model with an alternative sample selection and employing random
e¤ects. The former test attempts to ensure that our model is not misspecied by using a
sample of both investment grade and high yield rms. The latter test checks the sensitivity
of our results when we use the random e¤ects probit model to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity. This methodology di¤ers from the previous (pooled probit) approach since we
allow the residuals to have a random e¤ects structure.
7.1 Investment grade ratings
The vast majority of previous studies on ratings determination employ data with investment
grade rms. However, the existence of speculative grade rms makes our analysis more
12 Amato and Furnes model attains similar scores for the statistics, namely SC=0.52 and CP=0.32 for
the model with time dummies.
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interesting because these rms are more likely to be subject to nancing constraints. In
addition, as it was noted by AF (2004) restricting attention to investment grade issuers
only is likely to induce selection bias. On the other hand, pooling together both categories
may result in misspecication of our model if changes in nancial and business risk have a
di¤erent impact on rating determination across the two groups of rms. Therefore, we drop
all speculative grade rms and re-estimate the model from Table 5.
Results for the ordered probit models interacted with the investment grade dummy vari-
able are shown in Table 9. Once again, we observe positive coe¢ cients for LEV and negative
for OPER for both constrained and unconstrained categories. The coe¢ cients on leverage
are signicant for constrained rms in all three cases, while the point estimates on operating
margin are signicant for both categories. Both results are in line with those reported earlier.
For the variables COV and INTBURD the former retains its signicance for unconstrained
rms, while the latter nancial variable remains positive and generally insignicant for both
types of rms. Finally, the lagged dependent variables remain highily signicant suggesting
that a downgrade (upgrade) is more likely to be followed by a subsequent downgrade (up-
grade). Overall, we observe that our results remain largely unchanged by interacting the
dummy variable and our earlier results are therefore robust to this modication.
7.2 Random e¤ects probits
The preceding analysis has employed pooled ordered probit estimates to assess the impact
of nancial factors on credit ratings but it could be argued that the pooled models do not
explicitly take into consideration the panel nature of the dataset. Since we have repeated
observations for every rm the issue of unobserved time invariant heterogeneity arises. To
address this issue we can employ random e¤ects methods, but the downside of this method
is that it is conditioned on the strict exogeneity assumptions, which may not be valid. In
this section we re-estimate the baseline model augmented with nancing constraints using
the random e¤ects ordered probit method. Results for the random e¤ects ordered probit
models are reported in Table 10.
It is apparent that our results both quantitatively and qualitatively remain largely un-
changed. We still nd the estimated coe¢ cients on LEV to be positive and highly signicant
for rms classied as constrained (with the exception of dividend), but insignicant for un-
constrained rms. Once again, OPER appears to be negative and highly signicant for
both types of rms. Moving to COV and INTBURD we observe the former variable to be
negative and signicant for unconstrained rms as before, while the latter variable remains
positive but looses its signicance for both types of rms. The lagged dependent variables
remain strongly signicant conrming the persistence in ratings. Taking these results into
consideration, we can conclude that modeling credit ratings using random e¤ects methods
does not make a substantial di¤erence, suggesting that our results are not a by-product of
not taking into account the unobserved heterogeneity.
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8 Conclusion
Modeling credit ratings should take into account both business and nancial risks in a sys-
tematic fashion. The literature on ratings predictions has focused on a set of nancial ratios
usually incorporated in a standard ordered probit setting. However, this procedure may
perform badly since it does not account properly for the persistent nature of ratings. This
paper recognizes the dynamic property of credit ratings and examines their determinants
introducing both dynamics and the nancial constraints dimension. In particular, we aug-
ment the standard ordered probit models of the ratings predictions with lagged dependent
variables and we estimate it di¤erentiating between constrained and unconstrained rms. In
addition, we address the issue of procyclicality of ratings between di¤erent types of rms.
Our results, which are robust to alternative sample sections, di¤erent estimation tech-
niques, many specications and controls, can be summarized as follows. First, a baseline
model of rating determination that accounts for both business and nancial risks predicts
ratings with moderate success. However, when we introduce dynamics in the ordered probit
estimation we document an impressive increase in the predictive power of the model, which
indicates that modeling ratings persistence is an important consideration. Second, when we
di¤erentiate the e¤ects of nancial constraints across credit ratings, we show that nancial
variables have a di¤erential impact on rm-types in predicting credit ratings, depending on
whether rms are likely to face binding nancing constraints. In other words, we nd that
the nancial constraint dimension is rationally priced in the ratings industry. Third, we test
whether nancial variables are more important in predicting credit ratings during recession
and other periods. Our results indicate rating agencies provide ratings which are stable over
time, lending support to the through the cyclemethodology.
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Table 1
Statistics
Mean 0.25 Median 0.75
LEV
AAA AA 24.79 4.87 14.87 31.95
A 25.44 14.75 23.56 34.21
BBB 32.61 22.60 32.44 42.27
BB 40.35 30.18 40.05 48.49
B   CC 46.84 35.07 46.48 60.51
Total 29.03 16.47 26.95 39.74
INTBURD
AAA AA 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.08
A 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.08
BBB 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.07
BB 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.08
B   CC 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.07
Total 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.08
COV
AAA AA 12.56 4.20 7.91 13.97
A 9.43 3.37 5.80 10.27
BBB 7.35 2.31 3.53 6.89
BB 4.39 1.66 2.33 4.58
B   CC 2.34 1.02 1.64 2.43
Total 11.08 2.76 5.10 10.03
OPER
AAA AA 23.29 13.71 19.39 25.62
A 17.09 9.71 15.06 22.62
BBB 15.26 7.60 12.95 21.03
BB 14.17 5.91 11.28 15.94
B   CC 10.37 5.47 9.73 12.33
Total 16.25 8.32 13.60 21.83
SIZE
AAA AA 11.60 10.67 11.76 12.74
A 11.09 10.24 11.07 11.92
BBB 10.74 9.83 10.79 11.79
BB 10.46 9.67 10.57 11.31
B   CC 10.12 9.59 10.29 10.96
Total 10.94 9.92 10.84 11.81
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Table 2
Ratings per year
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Observations
1995 0 19 45 13 5 1 0 83
1996 0 23 56 17 4 2 0 102
1997 1 23 64 28 7 2 0 125
1998 1 25 67 41 10 3 0 147
1999 1 24 69 54 10 2 0 160
2000 1 30 85 64 10 4 0 194
2001 2 30 100 80 18 3 0 233
2002 2 27 109 94 27 3 1 264
2003 4 25 103 102 34 7 0 285
2004 4 27 120 120 33 7 2 313
Observations 16 253 828 613 158 34 3 1906
Table 3
The baseline model
LEV 0.027***
(11.4)
OPER -0.044***
(-11.3)
COV -0.007*
(-1.71)
INTBURD 0.089***
(6.60)
SIZE -0.478***
(-17.6)
CR4 -0.002
(-0.13)
R2 0.21
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all
specications. The left-hand side variable is the credit rating of a rm. In the analysis AAA-AA ratings are assigned a 1,
A a 2, and so on until CC ratings, which are assigned a 5. That is, lower ratings reect higher credit quality. Number of
rms and observations are 308 and 1737, respectively. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
24
Table 4
Dynamic Model
LEV 0.016***
(6.12)
OPER -0.036***
(-5.94)
COV -0.019***
(-3.64)
INTBURD 0.005
(0.26)
AAA  AA 1 -3.561***
(-8.77)
A 1 -2.465***
(-12.5)
BB 1 5.341***
(4.80)
B   CC 1 23.865***
(15.7)
AAA  AA(1) -3.119***
(-9.95)
A(1) -1.162***
(-6.96)
BB(1) 1.266***
(2.60)
B   CC(1) 0.298*
(1.86)
SIZE -0.499***
(-11.4)
CR4 -0.014
(-0.54)
Notes:. Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA_1
etc. The initial period observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in
all specications. Number of rms and observations are 296 and 1551, respectively. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%.
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Table 5
Financial constraints
INEBT DIVID SIZE
LEV  C 0.011** 0.014*** 0.045***
(2.50) (2.99) (7.26)
LEV  (1  C) -0.009 0.010* 0.004
(-0.76) (1.77) (1.17)
OPER  C -0.013** -0.012 -0.014***
(-2.10) (-1.31) (-3.32)
OPER  (1  C) -0.024*** -0.017* -0.065***
(-2.62) (-1.65) (-5.24)
COV  C -0.009 -0.004 -0.007
(-0.87) (-0.42) (-1.26)
COV  (1  C) -0.012** -0.030*** -0.025**
(-2.15) (-3.10) (-2.38)
INTBURD  C 0.028 0.023 -0.054***
(0.94) (1.07) (-2.84)
INTBURD  (1  C) 0.044 0.021 -0.020
(1.58) (0.62) (-0.70)
AAA AA 1 -3.099*** -4.143*** -4.130***
(-9.35) (-11.0) (-10.9)
A 1 -2.523*** -2.670*** -2.701***
(-11.9) (-14.1) (-14.1)
BB 1 5.298*** 5.581*** 5.175***
(4.53) (4.97) (4.81)
B   CC 1 15.107*** 14.452*** 21.279***
(25.2) (27.2) (14.6)
AAA AA(1) -3.428*** -3.357*** -3.069***
(-9.27) (-9.03) (-9.97)
A(1) -1.679*** -1.580*** -1.085***
(-13.6) (-12.4) (-6.91)
BB(1) 1.838*** 1.957*** 1.357***
(8.83) (9.96) (2.91)
B   CC(1) 2.468*** 2.591*** 0.472**
(4.08) (4.34) (2.55)
SIZE -0.212*** -0.225*** -0.502***
(-5.20) (-5.46) (-5.02)
CR4 -0.035 -0.032 0.010
(-1.61) (-1.44) (0.38)
SC 0.95 0.95 0.94
CP 0.90 0.91 0.90
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dummy variable C indicates in turn LESS INDEBTED,
LOW DIVIDEND and SMALL rms. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA_1 etc. The initial period
observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. SC stands for the \stopped clock statistic, and CP for the correct prediction
statistic. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specications. Number of rms and observations are 296
and 1551, respectively. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6
Procyclicality
INEBT DIVID SIZE
LEV  C D 0.014*** 0.044*** 0.011**
(2.58) (4.16) (2.21)
LEV  C  (1 D) 0.017*** 0.042*** -0.000
(4.46) (5.67) (-0.037)
LEV  (1  C) D 0.047** 0.011 0.043***
(2.01) (1.55) (3.53)
LEV  (1  C)  (1 D) -0.022 0.018* 0.047***
(-1.00) (1.94) (7.29)
OPER  C D -0.024*** -0.091*** -0.015**
(-2.78) (-3.18) (-2.30)
OPER  C  (1 D) -0.029*** -0.093*** -0.015***
(-5.03) (-4.41) (-3.91)
OPER  (1  C) D -0.017* -0.018** -0.049***
(-1.81) (-2.09) (-2.88)
OPER  (1  C)  (1 D) -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.065***
(-3.01) (-2.97) (-4.41)
COV  C D -0.005 -0.045 -0.001
(-0.41) (-0.75) (-0.12)
COV  C  (1 D) -0.008* 0.042 -0.005
(-1.72) (1.53) (-1.03)
COV  (1  C) D 0.005 -0.002 -0.012
(1.12) (-0.21) (-0.97)
COV  (1  C)  (1 D) -0.009 -0.024*** -0.015*
(-1.52) (-2.96) (-1.66)
INTBURD  C D 0.024 -0.042 -0.073***
(0.61) (-0.71) (-3.35)
INTBURD  C  (1 D) 0.015 -0.027 -0.031*
(0.81) (-0.83) (-1.66)
INTBURD  (1  C) D -0.079 0.002 -0.069
(-1.35) (0.039) (-1.04)
INTBURD  (1  C)  (1 D) 0.095* 0.027 -0.027
(1.75) (0.48) (-0.89)
AAA AA 1 -3.842*** -4.384*** -4.254***
(-9.15) (-11.2) (-10.6)
A 1 -2.517*** -2.856*** -2.759***
(-12.6) (-14.4) (-13.9)
BB 1 5.315*** 5.756*** 5.146***
(4.53) (5.16) (4.82)
B   CC 1 22.276*** 28.342*** 21.121***
(13.7) (12.1) (14.6)
AAA AA(1) -3.066*** -3.031*** -2.969***
(-9.48) (-8.80) (-8.79)
A(1) -1.184*** -1.053*** -1.052***
(-7.56) (-5.53) (-6.46)
BB(1) 1.195** 1.278*** 1.362***
(2.17) (3.53) (2.85)
B   CC(1) 0.471** 0.387* 0.496***
(2.18) (1.74) (2.61)
SIZE -0.413*** -0.420*** -0.491***
(-10.6) (-11.1) (-5.35)
CR4 0.012 0.019 0.007
(0.47) (0.49) (0.27)
SC 0.94 0.95 0.94
CP 0.90 0.91 0.90
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Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dummy variable D indicates recession/credit crunch. The
dummy variable C indicates in turn LESS INDEBTED, LOW DIVIDEND and SMALL rms. The one period lags of the
ratings are reported as AAA-AA_1 etc. The initial period observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. SC stands for the
\stopped clockstatistic, and CP for the correct predictionstatistic. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in
all specications. Number of rms and observations are 296 and 1551, respectively. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%.
Table 7
Static Predictions
Actual Rating Predicted Rating
AAA-AA A BBB BB B-CC Total
AAA AA 58 171 6 0 0 235
A 38 594 151 3 0 786
BBB 0 220 334 2 0 556
BB 1 20 97 14 0 134
B   CC 0 2 17 7 0 26
Total 97 1007 605 26 2 1,737
Notes: Statistics regarding the goodness of the t of the model are reported in the above Table. The leftmost column
shows actual ratings while the righthand side columns show the prediction of the static ordered probit
Table 8
Dynamic Predictions
Actual Rating Predicted Rating
AAA-AA A BBB BB B-CC Total
AAA AA 170 39 0 0 0 209
A 14 628 9 1 0 652
BBB 0 17 539 0 0 556
BB 0 0 0 112 0 115
B   CC 0 0 0 3 16 19
Total 184 684 551 113 19 1,551
Notes: Statistics regarding the goodness of the t of the model are reported in the above Table. The leftmost column
shows actual ratings while the righthand side columns show the prediction of the dynamic ordered probit.
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Table 9
Investment Grade
INEBT DIVID SIZE
LEV  C 0.019*** 0.035*** 0.058***
(2.79) (5.27) (7.39)
LEV  (1  C) -0.027 0.017* 0.002
(-1.31) (1.91) (0.35)
OPER  C -0.031*** -0.090*** -0.001
(-3.26) (-4.15) (-0.50)
OPER  (1  C) -0.029* -0.025*** -0.073***
(-1.93) (-2.72) (-4.66)
COV  C -0.000 0.010 -0.019*
(-0.039) (0.26) (-1.68)
COV  (1  C) -0.017* -0.037*** -0.019*
(-1.93) (-3.09) (-1.68)
INTBURD  C 0.021 0.013 -0.035**
(0.62) (0.38) (-2.33)
INTBURD  (1  C) 0.100 0.027 -0.108***
(1.60) (0.42) (-3.06)
AAA AA 1 -3.858*** -4.185*** -4.506***
(-3.93) (-10.9) (-11.22)
BBB 1 -2.690*** -2.841*** -3.212***
(-6.34) (-15.0) (-19.69)
AAA AA(1) -2.084*** -2.086*** -2.146***
(-4.87) (-9.52) (-9.22)
BBB(1) 1.278*** 1.294*** 1.839***
(6.02) (9.90) (14.7)
SIZE -0.463*** -0.431*** -0.260***
(-5.96) (-9.83) (-4.81)
CR4 0.018 0.008 0.006
(0.84) (0.30) (0.24)
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dummy variable C indicates in turn LESS INDEBTED,
LOW DIVIDEND and SMALL rms. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA_1 etc. The initial period
observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specications. Number
of rms and observations are 270 and 1398, respectively. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 10
Random effects
INEBT DIVID SIZE
LEV  C 0.034*** 0.019 0.052***
(2.75) (1.60) (3.36)
LEV  (1  C) 0.021 0.015 0.019
(1.05) (1.24) (1.63)
OPER  C -0.016 -0.051* -0.058***
(-0.92) (-1.67) (-2.79)
OPER  (1  C) -0.036** -0.025 -0.028
(-2.04) (-1.54) (-1.63)
COV  C -0.036 0.029 0.024
(-1.17) (0.63) (1.18)
COV  (1  C) -0.007 -0.032** -0.073***
(-0.52) (-2.15) (-4.78)
INTBURD  C -0.103 0.085 -0.099
(-1.44) (1.30) (-1.42)
INTBURD  (1  C) 0.006 0.048 0.025
(0.14) (0.88) (0.52)
AAA AA 1 -13.652 -20.965 -14.611
(-0.035) (-0.021) (-0.046)
A 1 -1.003*** -0.966*** -1.005***
(-7.02) (-6.65) (-6.71)
BB 1 9.288*** 9.456*** 9.743***
(10.6) (10.3) (10.4)
B   CC 1 32.227 32.963 34.694
(0.008) (0.000) (0.008)
AAA AA(1) -8.845*** -8.498*** -9.336***
(-13.9) (-14.1) (-12.9)
A(1) -3.795*** -3.504*** -4.169***
(-11.1) (-9.66) (-9.59)
BB(1) 1.264 1.902** 1.302
(1.36) (2.09) (1.36)
B   CC(1) -1.751* 0.725 -1.847*
(-1.74) (0.27) (-1.72)
SIZE -0.271*** -0.308*** -0.184
(-3.53) (-3.92) (-1.38)
CR4 0.051 0.047 0.062*
(1.54) (1.43) (1.80)
Notes: z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The dummy variable C indicates in turn LESS INDEBTED, LOW
DIVIDEND and SMALL rms. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA_1 etc. The initial period
observations are reported as AAA-AA(1) etc. Time dummies and industry dummies were included in all specications. Number
of rms and observations are 296 and 1551, respectively. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Rating Changes
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